Ethics 121 (2):335-53 (2011)

William A. Edmundson
Georgia State University
Consent theories of political obligation draw upon the unique powers consent exhibits in everyday dealings, but they are frustrated by the "problem of massive nonconsent." Expansions of what is counted as consent, such as tacit or hypothetical consent, have seemed untrue to the core concept of giving willing consent. David Estlund proposes a novel conception, "normative consent," to address the problem of massive nonconsent while being true to "the idiom of consent." This comment details consent’s virtues and shows that consent theories cannot claim enough of them to vindicate political obligation.
Keywords political obligation  consent  Estlund  political authority
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DOI 10.1086/658143
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Against Normative Consent.Nicolas Frank - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (4):470-487.
A Study on the Justification of Political Obligation: Focussed on the Classification of the Theories. 조일수 - 2012 - Journal of Ethics: The Korean Association of Ethics 1 (87):93-117.

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