What if ? Questions about conditionals

Mind and Language 18 (4):380–401 (2003)
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Abstract

Section 1 briefly examines three theories of indicative conditionals. The Suppositional Theory is defended, and shown to be incompatible with understanding conditionals in terms of truth conditions. Section 2 discusses the psychological evidence about conditionals reported by Over and Evans (this volume). Section 3 discusses the syntactic grounds offered by Haegeman (this volume) for distinguishing two sorts of conditional.

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Dorothy Edgington
Birkbeck, University of London

References found in this work

Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
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Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege.Gottlob Frege - 1952 - Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by P. T. Geach & Max Black.

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