The Inaugural Address: Two Kinds of Possibility

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78:1-22 (2004)
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Abstract

I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.

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Author's Profile

Dorothy Edgington
Birkbeck, University of London

Citations of this work

Modal Objectivity.Clarke-Doane Justin - 2019 - Noûs 53:266-295.
The Broadest Necessity.Andrew Bacon - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (5):733-783.
Williamsonian modal epistemology, possibility-based.Barbara Vetter - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):766-795.

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