Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania (2009)

Authors
Scott Edgar
Saint Mary's University
Abstract
In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), Kant sought to explain the objectivity of cognition by describing the operation of certain human cognitive activities. That is, in some sense Kant explained cognition's objectivity by appealing to features of the mind. A century later, the Marburg School Neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp would insist that philosophers must explain cognition's objectivity without appeal to the subject's mind. Once at the center of the Kantian account of objectivity, the mind had been expunged from it. This shift was the emergence of anti-psychologism, the view that the mind has no place in philosophical accounts of cognition's objectivity. This dissertation offers an account of how that shift happened. Chapter 1 argues that a central section of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Deduction, is a description of a cognitive operation—namely, the apperception's synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition. Because this operation is necessary, it determines the structures that a subject's cognition must conform to, and thus explains cognition's objectivity for Kant. But Kant's view that the mind is characterized by necessary cognitive operations was abandoned in the nineteenth century in favour of purely empirical conceptions of the mind. Chapter 2 argues that, in response to this change and in particular to the psychologism of the Back to Kant movement, Cohen developed an anti-psychologistic account of cognition's objectivity: for him, objectivity must be explained by appeal to the principles and laws of mathematics and pure natural science. But his account fails, since he does rot explain why those laws explain cognition's intersubjectivity. Chapter 3 examines Wilhelm Wundt's and Ernst Mach's attempts to articulate purely empirical conceptions of the mind, and to explain cognition's objectivity by appeal to the mind so conceived, as well as Hermann Lotze's anti-psychologism. Chapter 4 argues that, for Natorp, fundamental physical laws constitute the intersubjective content of cognition because they are invariant across space and time, and so different subjects can share representations of them despite having different points of view on the world. Natorp thus finally articulates a successful anti-psychologistic alternative to Kant's account of objectivity.
Keywords Kant  Neo-Kantianism  psychology  objectivity  space and time
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,226
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Paul Natorp and the Emergence of Anti-Psychologism in the Nineteenth Century.Scott Edgar - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):54-65.
Kant on Representation and Objectivity: An Essay on the B-Deduction.Adam Benjamin Dickerson - 2001 - Dissertation, University of New South Wales (Australia)
The Role of Imagination in Constituting Objectivity According to Kant.Ali Salmani & Saeed Haj Rashidian - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 21 (79):143-164.
Frege and Kant: A Study of Anti-Psychologism and Objectivity.Alan David Vraspir - 1985 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
The Concept of an Object.Morris David Lipson - 1981 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
Cohen Und Natorp.Harry van der Linden - 1990 - Idealistic Studies 20 (3):262-263.
Subjectivity as the Foundation for Objectivity in Kant and Husserl: On Two Types of Transcendental Idealism.Christian Krijnen - 2016 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 8 (2):280-303.
Kant on Representation and Objectivity.A. B. Dickerson - 2003 - Cambridge University Press.
The Physiology of the Sense Organs and Early Neo-Kantian Conceptions of Objectivity: Helmholtz, Lange, Liebmann.Scott Edgar - 2015 - In Flavia Padovani, Alan Richardson & Jonathan Y. Tsou (eds.), Objectivity in Science: Approaches to Historical Epistemology. Boston Studies in Philosophy and History of Science. Springer.
Kant’s Transcendental and Empirical Psychology of Cognition.Claudia M. Schmidt - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (4):462-472.
Völkerpsychologie and the Origins of Hermann Cohen’s Antipsychologism.Scott Edgar - 2020 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 10 (1):254-273.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-07-05

Total views
21 ( #532,156 of 2,499,690 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #209,789 of 2,499,690 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes