Journal of Philosophy 117 (9):473-500 (2020)
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| Abstract |
The rule account of self-conscious thought holds that a thought is self-conscious if and only if it contains a token of a concept-type that is governed by a reflexive rule. An account along these lines was discussed in the late 70s. Nevertheless, very few philosophers endorse it nowadays. I shall argue that this summary dismissal is partly unjustified. There is one version of the rule account that can explain a key epistemic property of self-conscious thoughts: Guarantee. Along the way, I will rebut a number of objections and introduce two constraints on how the reflexive rule is implemented.
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| Keywords | I-thoughts Self-consciousness I-concept Self |
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| DOI | 10.5840/jphil2020117930 |
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References found in this work BETA
Self-Reference and Self-Awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
Understanding Demonstratives.Gareth Evans - 1981 - In Herman Parret & Jacques Bouveresse (eds.), Meaning and Understanding. Berlin: de Gruyter. pp. 280--304.
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Citations of this work BETA
Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought.Michele Palmira - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
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