Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):50-71 (2010)

Authors
Kyla Ebels-Duggan
Northwestern University
Abstract
Rawls' requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies which they believe can be justified in 'public reason' depends on a certain ideal for the relationships between citizens. This is a valuable ideal, and thus citizens have reasons to try to achieve it. But it is not always possible to find the common ground that we would need in order to do so, and thus we should reject Rawls' strong claim that we have an obligation to defend our views in public reason. Because I recognize that we have strong reasons to conduct our political enquiry within the guidelines of political liberalism, but deny that we always have an obligation to do so, one might call my view 'permissive political liberalism'.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.591.x
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Citations of this work BETA

Public Reason.Jonathan Quong - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief.Allan Hazlett - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):131-151.
Public Justification.Kevin Vallier - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Political Testimony.Han van Wietmarschen - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (1):23-45.

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