Feminist Epistemology

Abstract

true (but not conversely); if someone is lucky in truly believing \x{D835}\x{DC5D}, their belief is not knowledge; if someone truly believes that \x{D835}\x{DC5D}, but cannot justify their belief with evidence, it is not knowledge; and so on

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Antony Eagle
University of Adelaide

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References found in this work

Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The scientific image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.
Feminism in philosophy of science: Making sense of contingency and constraint.Alison Wylie - 2000 - In Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 166--184.

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