On Moral Ignorance and Mistakes of Fact: a Response to Harman

Philosophia 48 (4):1355-1362 (2020)
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Abstract

Moral ignorance is always blameworthy, but “failing to realize” that P when you have sufficient evidence for P is sometimes exculpatory, according to Elizabeth Harman (2017). What explains this alleged puzzle? Harman (2017) leaves this an open question. In this article, a solution is offered

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Cheryl (C.E.) Abbate
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

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Conversation and Responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.
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