Abstract

This dissertation examines three contemporary schools of thought which endorse the liberal ideal of justifiability, namely that the state is to be deeply and broadly acceptable to its members, but which differ on just how the state is to do this. One predominant liberal perspective emphasizes equality. Liberal egalitarians, like Ronald Dworkin, believe that justifiability means above all else the avoidance of bias or partiality: state actions in favor of one way of life may not bias the amount of resources and protections available for others. A second liberal perspective emphasizes well being. Liberal perfectionists, like Martha Nussbaum, think the state is justified when it helps build up the capabilities its members need to achieve well being. A third liberal perspective emphasizes democratic agency. Liberal republicans, like Frank Michelman, believe the state is to play, above all else, a role in facilitating collective deliberation. Though these three perspectives are often seen as competitors in the project of defining liberalism, I show in this dissertation that they are interlocking components of a liberal political theory that understands the complexity of liberalism as a political ideal. To show this I offer two arguments: first, each perspective contains gaps and tensions that illustrate its incompleteness as a political ideal; second, the gaps and tensions of each perspective can be filled in, resolved by the other perspectives