The Philosophic Foundations of Mimetic Theory and Cognitive Science: (Including Artificial Intelligence)

Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 29 (1):1-13 (2022)
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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Philosophic Foundations of Mimetic Theory and Cognitive Science(Including Artificial Intelligence)Jean-Pierre Dupuy (bio)In the mid 1970s I discovered at the same time cognitive science and mimetic theory. Being a philosopher with a scientific background, I immediately brought them together and tried to reconceptualize the latter in terms of the former. In a sense, I haven't stopped doing that in the last 45 years. That is why I feel fully at home with the goals pursued by the organizers of this conference.I do not believe it is feasible or even desirable to operate the rapprochement between the two disciplines at a global level. The history of cognitive science is exceedingly involved, and the part played by artificial intelligence in it compared to the part played by the neurosciences has varied greatly over time.1 Only a piecemeal approach makes sense. I present here four short case studies that cover the whole period, from the beginnings in cybernetics to today's artificial intelligence (AI).In order to better situate these studies within a broader frame, I propose the diagram in Figure 1. To comment on it would require more time than available for my whole presentation. Let me just say the following. [End Page 1]It is essential to distinguish between two kinds of AI. The first to bear this name was launched by economist Herbert Simon and computer scientist Allan Newell at a Dartmouth conference in 1956. It was based on the premise that thinking is computing, with this computation bearing on sentences of a "language of thought" implementable in a digital computer. It turns out that this AI(1) was progressively substituted from the 1980s onward by an AI(2), which, to some extent, was a return to a fundamental result obtained by cybernetics in 1943. Neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch and mathematician Walter Pitts had constructed a mathematical model of a network of elementary calculators called "neurons" and explored its properties. The capacity to "think" was one of these. It was not situated at the elementary level, as was the case in AI(1), but it emerged at the collective level from the interactions between the neurons.This model was heavily criticized by the supporters of AI(1),2 and its first implementations, in the notorious "Perceptron" in particular (1957), were pitiful failures. However, the emergence of "second-order cybernetics" under the guidance of cybernetician Heinz von Foerster and the theory of complex, self-organizing systems that it helped develop, in cooperation and rivalry with similar efforts in the physical sciences, enabled the neural network model to come to a second life under different names: formal neurons, deep learning, big data, and the like. Together, they constitute AI(2).The following network of influences wouldn't have been possible without its stem, that is, the boxes containing the names of Kurt Gödel and Alan Turing. The former revolutionized logic by showing that reasoning about arithmetic and arithmetic are one and the same, insofar as it is possible to code in a 1-to-1 fashion propositions about integers (for instance, "7 is a prime number") by means of integers. The latter demonstrated that some mechanisms can self-transcend inasmuch as they generate an ensemble of outputs that cannot be defined mechanistically. Later, John von Neumann, who is credited along with Alan Turing with having invented the digital computer, would use this logical possibility to define complexity: A mechanism is complex if it is capable of generating one more complex than itself. The gate was open for the theories of complex, self-organizing systems to thrive and, by way of consequence, for AI(2) to emerge.fascination with modelsHerbert Simon (1916–2001), winner of the Nobel Prize in economics for his work on what he called "bounded rationality," is generally considered to be one [End Page 2] Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 1.of the founders of artificial intelligence. Some cognitive scientists still rely on the computer program that he devised with Alan Newell to simulate the creative processes of human thought—a program aptly named "General Problem Solver." The title of one of his principal works, The Sciences of the...

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