Abstract

Few topics in medical ethics stimulate as much heated debate as the question of the proper place of religious beliefs in medical practice. Typically, this debate is orientated towards questions about the religious beliefs held by medical practitioners, and in particular the appropriate limits that ought to be placed on these beliefs shaping care in ways that might impact negatively on patients’ interests. In this issue, however, it is the religious beliefs of patients themselves, and how these beliefs ought to be responded to by clinicians, that is the focus of analysis. In their Feature Article, Greenblum and Hubbard articulate a strong position in response to this issue. Their fundamental claim is that clinicians should not deliberate about religious commitments with religious patients when these patients are drawing on these commitments in the medical decision-making process. They present two main arguments in support of this claim: the public reason argument and the fiduciary argument, and they contend that the discussion of religious considerations should be compartmentalised and farmed out to another appropriately placed person, such as a member of the clergy. Stimulating six commentaries that interrogate aspects of both arguments and the authors’ practical proposal, Greenblum and Hubbard’s paper gets to the heart of the challenge of reconciling the public role of medical practitioners with the private encounters that substantiate the performance of this role. Greenblum and Hubbard’s first argument is that clinicians ought to limit their deliberations in decisions made with patients to presenting ‘considerations that any reasonable person could recognise as counting in favour of something’. Drawing on the work of John Rawls and Robert Audi, the authors discount the place of religious reasons in …