Wittgenstein on sensation and 'seeing-as'

Synthese 60 (September):349-368 (1984)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This essay begins by providing a new account of wittgenstein's private language argument. Wittgenstein's rejection of a "cartesian" account of mind is examined, And it is argued that this rejection carries no commitment to behaviorism, Or to the view that sensation terms have public meanings and private references. Part ii of the essay attempts to forge a link between the two parts of the "philosophical investigations", By arguing that wittgenstein's discussion of "seeing-As" reinforces and illuminates his account of how sensation language is mastered



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,215

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

142 (#90,027)

6 months
1 (#449,220)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Avner Baz on aspects and concepts: a critique.Reshef Agam-Segal - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-33.
Concrete Concepts in Basic Cognition.Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1093-1116.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references