Reflections of Reason: Kant on Practical Judgment

Kantian Review (4):1-22 (2023)
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Abstract

My aim in this paper is to provide an account of practical judgement, for Kant, that situates it within his theory of judgement as a whole—particularly, with regards to the distinction between the determining and reflecting use of judgement. I argue that practical judgement is a kind of determining judgement, but also one in which reflecting judgement plays a significant role. More specifically, I claim that practical judgement arises from the cooperation of the reflecting power of judgement with the faculty of reason—the former assisting the latter in the application of its principle. I conclude by considering a possible role for feeling in practical judgement.

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Nicholas Dunn
Okanagan University College

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