Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (5-6):658-685 (2014)

Authors
Katherine Dunlop
University of Texas at Austin
Abstract
In his 1763 Prize Essay, Kant is thought to endorse a version of formalism on which mathematical concepts need not apply to extramental objects. Against this reading, I argue that the Prize Essay has sufficient resources to explain how the objective reference of mathematical concepts is secured. This account of mathematical concepts’ objective reference employs material from Wolffian philosophy. On my reading, Kant's 1763 view still falls short of his Critical view in that it does not explain the universal, unconditional applicability of mathematical concepts
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2014.967738
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References found in this work BETA

Mathematical Thought and its Objects.Charles Parsons - 2007 - Cambridge University Press.
Philosophical Papers and Letters.Martha Kneale - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (4):574.
Kant on the Mathematical Method.Jaakko Hintikka - 1967 - The Monist 51 (3):352-375.

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Citations of this work BETA

Definitions and Empirical Justification in Christian Wolff’s Theory of Science.Katherine Dunlop - 2018 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 21 (1):149-176.

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