Review of Metaphysics 51 (2):379-404 (1997)

IN THIS PAPER I ATTEMPT TO UNDERSTAND HEGEL’S CLAIM that the moral will is finite, or incompletely free, as a consequence of the moral will being structured by the logical concept of judgment. Section 2 begins with a brief discussion of judgment. It then identifies the defining features of the moral will and compares them to those of judgment, enabling us to conclude that judgment is the logical structure of the moral will. Section 3 considers the limitations that plague judgment and produce the finitude of the moral will. Section 4 examines three separate attempts of the moral will to overcome this finitude, all of which fail in virtue of their own logical structures. This allows us to conclude that the moral will is insuperably finite, and that the will must be reconceived as having a different logical structure in ethical life if it is to be free.
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
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Reprint years 2011
ISBN(s) 0034-6632
DOI revmetaph1997512130
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