Shane Duarte
University of Notre Dame
According to Margaret Wilson, Leibniz is inconsistent when it comes to the question of whether one can have distinct ideas of sensible qualities, and this because he sometimes conceives of sensible qualities as sensations and sometimes conceives of them as complexes of primary qualities. When he conceives of them as sensations, he denies that we can have distinct ideas of sensible qualities; when he conceives of them as complexes of primary qualities, he asserts that we can. In this paper I argue that Wilson is wrong to think that Leibnizian ideas admit of various degrees of confusion or distinctness. I also argue that although Wilson's problem admits of being reformulated in a manner consistent with a correct understanding of Leibnizian perceptions and ideas, this reformulated version of the problem admits to a satisfactory interpretive solution.
Keywords Idea  Perception  Confused  Distinct  Primary  Secondary  Quality
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DOI 10.1080/09608780903135089
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References found in this work BETA

Monadology.Montgomery Furth - 1967 - Philosophical Review 76 (2):169-200.
Was Leibniz Confused About Confusion?Stephen M. Puryear - 2005 - The Leibniz Review 15:95-124.
Confused Ideas.Margaret D. Wilson - 1977 - Rice University Studies 63.

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Citations of this work BETA

Leibniz on Sensation and the Limits of Reason.Walter Ott - 2016 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (2):135-153.
Leibniz and the Molyneux Problem.Bridger Ehli - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):8.

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