Breaking the ties: epistemic significance, bacilli, and underdetermination

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (3):627-641 (2007)
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Abstract

One premise of the underdetermination argument is that entailment of evidence is the only epistemic constraint on theory-choice. I argue that methodological rules can be epistemically significant, both with respect to observables and unobservables. Using an example from the history of medicine—Koch’s 1882 discovery of tuberculosis bacteria—I argue that even anti-realists ought to accept that these rules can break the tie between theories that are allegedly underdetermined. I then distinguish two types of underdetermination and argue that anti-realists, in order to maintain the underdetermination argument, need to do more than show that theories are empirically equivalent: they need to show that a certain kind of underdetermination obtains

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Dana Tulodziecki
Purdue University

Citations of this work

A case study in explanatory power: John Snow’s conclusions about the pathology and transmission of cholera.Dana Tulodziecki - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 42 (3):306-316.

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References found in this work

Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 1991 - London and New York: Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
The concept of observation in science and philosophy.Dudley Shapere - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (4):485-525.
Dimensions of observability.Peter Kosso - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4):449-467.

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