The Moral Virtue of Being Understanding

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (4):917-932 (2021)
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Abstract

Being understanding is a moral virtue. But what exactly is it that an understanding person does excellently? And what exactly makes it a moral virtue, rather than an intellectual one? Stephen Grimm suggests that an understanding person judges other people’s moral failings accurately without being too permissive or too judgemental. I argue against this view and develop an alternative one. First I demonstrate that judging other people’s failures accurately is neither necessary nor sufficient for being understanding and that Grimm leaves the moral nature of being understanding underexplored. I then draw on a related discussion on the moral virtue of open-mindedness and argue that a virtue is a moral one when it is a corrective to selfish and other weak inclinations that pull us away from feeling and acting as the situation demands. In order to fill in what this means in the case of being understanding, I turn to Iris Murdoch’s notion of attention. Being understanding, I argue, is the virtue of appropriately attending to others who are in a difficult situation.

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References found in this work

The Sovereignty of Good.Iris Murdoch - 1970 - New York,: Routledge.
The Sovereignty of Good.Iris Murdoch - 1970 - New York,: Routledge.
The Sovereignty of Good.Iris Murdoch - 1971 - Religious Studies 8 (2):180-181.
Virtues and Vices.Philippa Foot - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):117-121.
Virtues and vices.Philippa Foot - 1997 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader. Edinburgh University Press. pp. 163--177.

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