Moralism

Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2):137–151 (2005)
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Abstract

abstract In this paper moralism is defined as the illicit use of moral considerations. Three different varieties of moralism are then discussed — moral absolutism, excessive standards and demandingness, and presenting non‐moral considerations as moral ones. Both individuals and theories can be regarded as moralistic in some of these senses. Indeed, some critics of consequentialism have regarded that theory as moralistic. The author then describes the problems associated with each sense of ‘moralism’ and how casuistry evolved to try to deal with some of these problems. The author also defends consequentialism against one charge of moralism [1]

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Julia Driver
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

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Moral grandstanding as a threat to free expression.Justin Tosi & Brandon Warmke - 2020 - Social Philosophy and Policy 37 (2):170-189.

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References found in this work

Probabilism.C. A.. J. Coady - 1997 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 21 (1):16-33.

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