Vladimir Drekalović
University of Montenegro
This discussion note points to some verbal imprecisions in the formulation of the Enhanced Indispensability Argument. The examination of the plausibility of alternative interpretations reveals that the argument’s minor premise should be understood as a particular, not a universal, statement. Interpretations of the major premise and the conclusion oscillate between de re and de dicto readings. The attempt to find an appropriate interpretation for the EIA leads to undesirable results. If assumed to be valid and sound, the argument warrants the rationality of the belief in an unusual variant of Platonism. On the other hand, if taken as it stands, the argument is either invalid or is unsound or does not support the mathematical Platonism. Thus, the EIA in its present form cannot serve as a useful device for the Platonist.
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DOI 10.1007/s10838-017-9381-0
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The Indispensability of Mathematics.Mark Colyvan - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Mathematical Explanation in Science.Alan Baker - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):611-633.

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