The Morality of Art: Collingwood's View

Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University (1987)
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Abstract

There is something unsatisfactory about the moral condemnation of good works of art: the judgement "that work of art is aesthetically good and morally bad" seems unreasonable. Since the unreasonableness is not one of direct contradiction, it would seem that there must be an indirect contradiction involving a third thing to which aesthetic value and moral value are both connected. ;This dissertation aims to examine this unreasonableness by studying one significant position concerning it. This is the position found by combining the aesthetic theory and moral theory of R. G. Collingwood , and by articulating a theory of judgement and criticism on his behalf. ;The main findings of this dissertation are as follows. First, Collingwood's concept of mind underlies both his aesthetic theory and his moral theory. It also suggests two levels of judgement: mere assertion or denial, and assertion of a ground for that assertion or denial. Second, Collingwood regards a good work of art as successful expression of the artist's emotion, and bad art as failure to express emotion. Third, Collingwood regards a morally good act as an act done from duty and a morally bad act as an act done contrary to duty. Fourth, on the first-level aesthetic judgements and moral judgements seem unconnected. But on the second-level they are shown to have the same ground--duty. The form of a second-level affirmative aesthetic judgement is "That is a good work of art, because the artist acted from his duty to express his emotion honestly." ;The conclusion is that, for Collingwood, an aesthetically good work of art has to be morally good as well, because an aesthetically good work of art is an act done from duty. Therefore, an affirmative aesthetic judgement and a negative moral judgement about the same work contradict each other. However, Collingwood's view does not take into account the possibility of the artist's having greater duties or conflicting duties; in expressing his emotion, the artist may be neglecting or acting contrary to some greater duty

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