The intentionality of cognitive states

Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):281-294 (1980)
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10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00408.x

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Fred Dretske
Last affiliation: Duke University

Citations of this work

Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - , US: Oxford University Press.
The intentionality and intelligibility of moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations.Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever - 2021 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 214-233.

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