Slater on Self-Referential Arguments

Analysis 54 (1):61 - 64 (1994)
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Abstract

This is a reply to B. H. Slater's article "Liar Syllogisms and Related Paradoxes" (Analysis 51, 146-153), which raised an objection to one of the arguments considered in my article "Liar Syllogisms" (Analysis 50, 1-7). Slater's objection is shown to be a failure. In effect, the paradoxicality of liar syllogisms is vindicated.

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Theodore Drange
West Virginia University

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Self-reference and validity.Stephen Read - 1979 - Synthese 42 (2):265 - 274.

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