Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):288–307 (2007)
AbstractIn this paper, we discuss three probabilistic arguments for the existence of multiple universes. First, we provide an analysis of total evidence and use that analysis to defend Roger White's "this universe" objection to a standard fine-tuning argument for multiple universes. Second, we explain why Rodney Holder's recent cosmological argument for multiple universes is unconvincing. Third, we develop a "Cartesian argument" for multiple universes. While this argument is not open to the objections previously noted, we show that, given certain highly plausible assumptions about evidence and epistemic probability, the proposition which it treats as evidence cannot coherently be regarded as evidence for anything. This raises the question of whether to reject the assumptions or accept that such a proposition cannot be evidence.
Similar books and articles
Megill’s Multiverse Meta-Argument.Klaas J. Kraay - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):235-241.
The Realization of Infinitely Many Universes in Cosmology.Rodney D. Holder - 2001 - Religious Studies 37 (3):343-350.
Multiple Universes and Observation Selection Effects.Darren Bradley - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):72.
Evidential Arguments From Evil.Richard Otte - 2000 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (1):1-10.
Multiple Universes and the Fine-Tuning Argument: A Response to Rodney Holder.Michael Rota - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):556–576.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):241-294.
The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Requirement of Total Evidence.Peter Fisher Epstein - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):639-658.