Abstract

There is no necessary connection between the ideas of history and of narration. The historical work should be explanatory, but a narrative is not itself a form of explanation. Walsh, despite Danto's objections, is correct in distinguishing "plain" from "significant" narratives. Both White's causal-chain model and Danto's model of causal input suggest that an historical narrative can be eq~planatory only if it offers causal explanation. But Gallie's followable contingency model contains several structural ideas which bring him into logical conflict with the claims of these causal models. According to Gallie, explanations are intrusive, required only by failure of narrative continuity. A narrative becomes explanatory when it can incorporate contingencies, which may be necessary conditions instead of causes. History, unlike science, strives for synthetic unity rather than for the removal of all contingency from its subject matter. The role narrative plays in achieving this unity deserves increased philosophic attention