Alienation, Self-Blindness, and the Concept of Belief

In Adam Andreotta & Benjamin Winokur (eds.), New perspectives on transparency and self-knowledge. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 142-165 (2025)
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Abstract

Richard Moran and Matthew Boyle have objected to a variety of accounts of self-knowledge of belief on the grounds that they depict us, in possessing that knowledge, as alienated from our beliefs. The idea of alienation is meant to capture something important about the first-person perspective and to help us rule out competing accounts of self-knowledge. Moran and Boyle’s claim is that standing in a first-personal relation to one’s belief involves both knowing what one believes and occupying the perspective of that belief on the world. This is the Alienation Constraint. The goal of the chapter is to provide a novel argument for it. Drawing on Shoemaker’s idea that it is impossible for a rational and conceptually competent subject to be “self-blind”, it argues that our capacity for self-knowledge must be constitutive of possession of the concept of belief, the Concept Constraint. The chapter argues that the Alienation Constraint follows from the Concept Constraint on an independently plausible understanding of the concept of belief.

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Casey Doyle
State University of New York at Binghamton

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