European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):148-161 (2019)

Authors
Casey Doyle
State University of New York at Binghamton
Abstract
This essay addresses the question how we know our conscious thinking. Conscious thinking typically takes the form of a series of discrete episodes that constitute a complex cognitive activity. We must distinguish the discrete episodes of thinking in which a particular content is represented in phenomenal consciousness and is present “before the mind’s eye” from the extended activities of which these episodes form a part. The extended activities are themselves contentful and we have first-person access to them. But because their content is not represented in phenomenal consciousness, this access cannot be broadly observational. Instead, I argue, it is agential. Furthermore, that extended activities are intentional explains the possibility of a nonobservational form of introspective access to the discrete episodes in consciousness.
Keywords self-knowledge  agency  observation  consciousness  thinking  practical knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/ejop.12378
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References found in this work BETA

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
Intention.P. L. Heath - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281.
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):509-510.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Activity of Reasoning: How Reasoning Can Constitute Epistemic Agency.David Jenkins - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (3):413-428.

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