Formulating the thesis of physicalism: An introduction

Philosophical Studies 131 (1):1-23 (2006)
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Abstract

Perhaps more controversial than whether physicalism is true is what exactly would have to be true for physicalism to be true. Everyone agrees that, intuitively at least, physicalism is the thesis that there is nothing over and above the physical. The disagreements arise in how to get beyond this intuitive formulation. Until about ten years ago, participants in this debate were concerned primarily with answering two questions. First, what is it for a property, kind, relation, or individual to be a physical one?

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Janice Dowell
Syracuse University

References found in this work

Sensations and brain processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.

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