The harms of status enhancement could be compensated or outweighed: a response to Agar

Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (2):75-76 (2013)
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Abstract

Nicholas Agar argues, that enhancement technologies could be used to create post-persons—beings of higher moral status than ordinary persons—and that it would be wrong to create such beings.1 I am sympathetic to the first claim. However, I wish to take issue with the second.Agar's second claim is grounded on the prediction that the creation of post-persons would, with at least moderate probability, harm those who remain mere persons. The harm that Agar has in mind here is a kind of meta-harm: the harm of being made more susceptible to being permissibly harmed—more liable to harm. Agar suggests that, if post-persons existed, mere persons could frequently be permissibly sacrificed in order to provide benefits to the post-persons. For instance, perhaps they could be permissibly used in lethal medical experiments designed to develop medical treatments for post-persons. By contrast, he suggests that mere persons typically cannot be permissibly sacrificed to provide benefits to other mere persons. He thus claims that mere persons would be more liable to sacrifice if post-persons existed than they are in the absence of post-persons. The creation of post-persons would make them worse off in at least this one respect.Agar then argues that, since this meta-harm imposed on mere persons would not be compensated, it would be wrong to create post-persons. It is here that I believe his argument begins to go awry. According to the concept of compensation that Agar deploys , a harm imposed on X is compensated just in …

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Thomas Douglas
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Egalitarianism and Moral Bioenhancement.Robert Sparrow - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics 14 (4):20-28.
The Morality of Moral Neuroenhancement.Thomas Douglas - 2014 - In Levy Neil & Clausen Jens (eds.), Handbook on Neuroethics. Springer.
We Must Create Beings with Moral Standing Superior to Our Own.Vojin Rakić - 2015 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24 (1):58-65.

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References found in this work

Human enhancement and supra-personal moral status.Thomas Douglas - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):473-497.

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