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On Bradley’s preservation condition for conditionals
Erkenntnis 67 (1):111-118 (2007)
Abstract
Bradley has argued that a truth-conditional semantics for conditionals is incompatible with an allegedly very weak and intuitively compelling constraint on the interpretation of conditionals. I argue that the example Bradley offers to motivate this constraint can be explained along pragmatic lines that are compatible with the correctness of at least one popular truth-conditional semantics for conditionals.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals.Richard Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (4):539-571.
References found in this work
The logic of conditionals: an application of probability to deductive logic.Ernest Wilcox Adams - 1996 - Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co..
Hume's problem: induction and the justification of belief.Colin Howson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Probabilities of conditionals and conditional probabilities.David Lewis - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (3):297-315.
Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century Vol 1.: The Dawn of Meaning.Scott Soames - 2003 - Princeton University Press.
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