The epistemic benefits of religious disagreement

Religious Studies 56 (3):390-408 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Scientific researchers welcome disagreement as a way of furthering epistemic aims. Religious communities, by contrast, tend to regard it as a potential threat to their beliefs. But I argue that religious disagreement can help achieve religious epistemic aims. I do not argue this by comparing science and religion, however. For scientific hypotheses are ideally held with a scholarly neutrality, and my aim is to persuade those who arecommittedto religious beliefs that religious disagreement can be epistemically beneficial for them too.

Similar books and articles

Religious Diversity and Disagreement.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In M. Fricker, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, D. Henderson & P. J. Graham (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 185-195.
Disagreement from the Religious Margins.Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):371-395.
Religious Disagreement.Helen De Cruz - 2019 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Disagreement, Religious.John Pittard - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Religious disagreement: internal and external. [REVIEW]Dennis Potter - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):21-31.
Disagreement.Graham Oppy - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3):183-199.
Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Journal of Psychology and Theology 46 (4):292– 304.
Religious Disagreement.John Pittard - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conciliationism and Religious Disagreement.John Pittard - 2014 - In Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press. pp. 80-97.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-12-03

Downloads
689 (#22,880)

6 months
115 (#31,380)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Katherine Dormandy
University of Innsbruck

Citations of this work

Exploitative Epistemic Trust.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - In Trust in Epistemology. New York City, New York, Vereinigte Staaten: pp. 241-264.
Disagreement and Religion.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40.
Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Journal of Psychology and Theology 46 (4):292– 304.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.

View all 37 references / Add more references