Preferences, welfare, and the status-quo bias

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):535-554 (2010)

Abstract

Preferences play a role in well-being that is difficult to escape, but whatever authority one grants to preferences, their malleability seems to cause problems for any theory of well-being that employs them. Most importantly, preferences appear to display a status-quo bias: people come to prefer what they are likely rather than unlikely to get. I try to do two things here. The first is to provide a more precise characterization of the status-quo bias, how it functions, and how it infects commonly accepted theories of well-being. The second is to give an alternative characterization of an agent's preferences that succeeds in avoiding the status-quo bias

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,855

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
133 (#90,471)

6 months
2 (#257,917)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dale Dorsey
University of Kansas

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
From a Logical Point of View.W. V. O. Quine - 1953 - Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

View all 48 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.
Subjectivism Without Desire.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.
Desire-Satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):151-171.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Critique in Need of Critique.M. Peterson, A. Hollis & T. Pogge - 2010 - Public Health Ethics 3 (2):178-185.
Where Do Preferences Come From?Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637.
Collective Preferences, Obligations, and Rational Choice.Margaret Gilbert - 2001 - Economics and Philosophy 17 (1):109-119.
Approaching Homelessness: An Integral Re-Frame.Marilyn Hamilton - 2007 - World Futures 63 (2):107 – 126.
Challenging the Status Quo.Dominic Wilkinson - 2009 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 6 (2):235-237.