Faith and Philosophy 35 (1):56-83 (2018)

Authors
Katherine Dormandy
University of Innsbruck
Abstract
Resolving religious disagreements is difficult, for beliefs about religion tend to come with strong biases against other views and the people who hold them. Evidence can help, but there is no agreed-upon policy for weighting it, and moreover bias affects the content of our evidence itself. Another complicating factor is that some biases are reliable and others unreliable. What we need is an evidence-weighting policy geared toward negotiating the effects of bias. I consider three evidence-weighting policies in the philosophy of religion and advocate one of them as the best for promoting the resolution of religious disagreements.
Keywords religious epistemology  faith and reason  religious disagreement  religious diversity  religious evidentialism  bias  implicit bias
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI 10.5840/faithphil201812697
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen E. Longino - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.
Disagreement and Religion.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40.
Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Journal of Psychology and Theology 46 (4):292– 304.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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