Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?

Journal of Psychology and Theology 46 (4):292– 304 (2018)
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Abstract

In a fallen world fraught with evidence against religious beliefs, it is tempting to think that, on the assumption that those beliefs are true, the best way to protect them is to hold them dogmatically. Dogmatic belief, which is highly confident and resistant to counterevidence, may fail to exhibit epistemic virtues such as humility and may instead manifest epistemic vices such as arrogance or servility, but if this is the price of secure belief in religious truths, so be it. I argue, however, that even in a world full of misleading evidence against true religious beliefs, cultivating epistemic humility is the better way to achieve believers’ epistemic aims. The reason is that dogmatic belief courts certain epistemic dangers, including to the true religious beliefs themselves, whereas epistemic humility empowers believers to counter them.

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Author's Profile

Katherine Dormandy
University of Innsbruck

Citations of this work

Disagreement and Religious Practice.Katherine Dormandy - forthcoming - In Maria Baghramian, Adam Carter & R. Rowland (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Disagreement. Routledge.
Intellectual Humility and Epistemic Trust.Katherine Dormandy - 2021 - In Mark Alfano, Michael Patrick Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. New York, NY: Routledge.
The Loyalty of Religious Disagreement.Katherine Dormandy - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 238-270.

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References found in this work

True Enough.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2017 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations.Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr & Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):509-539.
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
Inattentional Blindness.Arien Mack & Irvin Rock - 1998 - MIT Press. Edited by Richard D. Wright.

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