A Perfectionist Humean Constructivism

Ethics 128 (3):574-602 (2018)
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Abstract

In this article, I articulate and explore a novel constructivist approach to metanormativity that is inspired by David Hume’s metaesthetics. This view, which I call perfectionist Humean constructivism, rejects the claim that practical reasons are constructed by each individual’s valuing attitudes, holding instead that they are constructed by humanity’s shared evaluative nature. I hold that this approach can plausibly respond to a persistent worry for extant versions of Humean constructivism without embracing the commitments of either a Kantian constructivism or a metaphysically robust form of metanormative realism.

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Dale Dorsey
University of Kansas

References found in this work

Constructivism about reasons.Sharon Street - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:207-45.
A Sensible Subjectivism.David Wiggins - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Humean Constructivism in Moral Theory.James Lenman - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5.
What Do Reasons Do?Jonathan Dancy - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):95-113.

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