Aggregation, Partiality, and the Strong Beneficence Principle

Philosophical Studies 146 (1):139 - 157 (2009)
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Consider the Strong Beneficence Principle (SBP): Persons of affluent means ought to give to those who might fail basic human subsistence until the point at which they must give up something of comparable moral importance. This principle has been the subject of much recent discussion. In this paper, I argue that no coherent interpretation of SBP can be found. SBP faces an interpretive trilemma, each horn of which should be unacceptable to fans of SBP; SBP is either (a) so strong as to be patently absurd; (b) implausible given its acceptance of a form of numbers skepticism; (c) drained of all its demanding force. In the conclusion, I show how the problems with SBP generalize to all similarly demanding principles of beneficence



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Dale Dorsey
University of Kansas

Citations of this work

Famine, Action, and the Normative.Shane Ryan & Fei Song - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (1):59-69.
Impartiality or Oikeiôsis? Two Models of Universal Benevolence.Landon Frim - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.

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References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Practical Ethics.Peter Singer - 1979 - Cambridge University Press.
The Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1797/1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Famine, affluence, and morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Oxford University Press USA.

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