Abstract
This essay provides a critical examination of Rawls' (and Rawlsians') conception of self-respect, the social bases of self-respect, and the normative justification of equality in the social bases of self-respect. I defend a rival account of these notions and the normative ideals at stake in political liberalism and a theory of social justice. I make the following arguments: (1) I argue that it is unreasonable to take self-respect to be a primary social good, as Rawls and his interpreters characterize it; (2) secondly, drawing on a distinction made by Darwall, I argue that recognition respect provides a far more suitable notion of respect for a theory of justice than Rawls' notion of appraisal respect; (3) thirdly, I argue that Rawls' treatment of self-respect and the social bases of self-respect as empirical conceptions should be rejected in favor of normative notions of a reasonable or justified self-respect and equality in reasonable social bases of self-respect; (4) I argue that Rawls' notions of political liberalism and public reason provide a way of grounding a notion of the reasonable social bases of self-respect in political ideals of the person implicit in modern economic institutions, and family relations, ignored by Rawlsians—but as central to reasonable social bases of self-respect and justice, as Rawlsians' ideal of persons as free and equal citizens.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1080/00201740902790219
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,464
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Justice, Gender and the Family.Susan Moller Okin - 1989 - Hypatia 8 (1):209-214.
Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice.G. A. Cohen - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (1):3-30.
3 Rawls on Justification.T. M. Scanlon - 2003 - In Samuel Richard Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls. Cambridge University Press. pp. 139.
Justice, Gender, and the Family.Martha L. Fineman - 1991 - Ethics 101 (3):647-649.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Respect.Robin S. Dillon - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Real Self-Respect and its Social Bases.Christian Schemmel - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (5):628-651.
Incentives, Inequality and Self-Respect.Richard Penny - 2013 - Res Publica 19 (4):335-351.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-05-07

Total views
130 ( #91,238 of 2,520,772 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #405,623 of 2,520,772 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes