Opaque Sweetening and Transitivity

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):559-571 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


I argue that any plausible decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences which obeys the Never Worse Principle will violate Transitivity. The Never Worse Principle says that if one option never does worse than another, you shouldn’t disprefer it. Transitivity says that if you prefer X to Y and you prefer Y to Z, then you should prefer X to Z. Violating Transitivity allows one to be money pumped. Although agents with incomplete preferences are already, in virtue of having incomplete preferences, vulnerable to being money pumped, I argue that the money pump argument for Transitivity is more serious than the one for Completeness.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,873

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Stochastic Dominance and Opaque Sweetening.Ralf M. Bader - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):498-507.
The Transitivity and Asymmetry of Actual Causation.Sander Beckers & Joost Vennekens - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4:1-27.
A General Concept of Being a Part of a Whole.Andrzej Pietruszczak - 2014 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 55 (3):359-381.
Intransitivity.Stuart Rachels - 2001 - In Lawrence C. Becker Mary Becker & Charlotte Becker (eds.), Encyclopedia of Ethics, Volume 2. Routledge.
Vaulting Intuition: Temkin's Critique of Transitivity.Alex Voorhoeve - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):409-425.
Sweetening the scent: commentary on "What principlism misses".D. K. Sokol - 2009 - Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (4):232-233.
Rigid/non-rigid grounding and transitivity.Mark Makin - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):136-150.
Spectrum arguments and hypersensitivity.Theron Pummer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1729-1744.
Truth‐Grounding and Transitivity.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):332-340.
A condition for transitivity in high probability.William Roche - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (3):435-444.


Added to PP

108 (#166,355)

6 months
29 (#110,638)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ryan Doody
Brown University

Citations of this work

The hard problem of intertheoretic comparisons.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1401-1427.
Rational Intransitive Preferences.Peter Baumann - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):3-28.
What does incommensurability tell us about agency?Luke Elson - 2021 - In Henrik Andersson & Anders Herlitz (eds.), Value Incommensurability: Ethics, Risk. And Decision-Making. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 181-198.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
Weighing lives.John Broome - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Hard Choices.Ruth Chang - 2017 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 3 (1):1-21.

View all 15 references / Add more references