Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):559-571 (2019)

Ryan Doody
Brown University
I argue that any plausible decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences which obeys the Never Worse Principle will violate Transitivity. The Never Worse Principle says that if one option never does worse than another, you shouldn’t disprefer it. Transitivity says that if you prefer X to Y and you prefer Y to Z, then you should prefer X to Z. Violating Transitivity allows one to be money pumped. Although agents with incomplete preferences are already, in virtue of having incomplete preferences, vulnerable to being money pumped, I argue that the money pump argument for Transitivity is more serious than the one for Completeness.
Keywords decision theory  incomplete preferences  transitivity  opaque sweetening  incommensurable values  dominance
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2018.1520269
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Truth and Probability.F. Ramsey - 1926 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge. pp. 52-94.
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Voluntarist Reasons and the Sources of Normativity.Ruth Chang - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 243-71.

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The Hard Problem of Intertheoretic Comparisons.Jennifer Rose Carr - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-27.

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