In Giancarlo Marchetti (ed.), The Ethics, Epistemology and Politics of Richard Rorty. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 50-63 (2021)
AbstractRonald Dworkin and Richard Rorty are sometimes thought to be diametrically opposed philosophers, particularly in their approach to foundational questions in moral thought. Dworkin is a champion of truth and objectivity in morality. Rorty, by contrast, is a great pragmatist who subscribed to a deflated vision of truth and unambiguously renounced objectivity, in favor of what he called “solidarity”. If their stated -isms and alliances were not evidence enough of discord, they also criticized one another in print, particularly on these foundational, or metaethical, questions. The point of this chapter is to show that things are not what they seem: Rorty and Dworkin largely agree on metaethics. The difference between them is largely a difference in emphasis.
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford University Press UK.