A Paradox in Intentionalism

British Journal of Aesthetics 45 (1):32-48 (2005)
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Abstract

I argue that intentionalism in aesthetics and in legal interpretation is vulnerable to a different sort of criticism than is found in the voluminous literature on the topic. Specifically, a kind of paradox arises for the intentionalist out of recognition of a second-order intention embedded in the social practices that characterize both art and law. The paper shows how this second-order intention manifests itself in each of the two enterprises, and argues that its presence entails the overriding centrality of the public text, and hence a rejection of the interpretive stance distinctive of intentionalism itself

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Daniel Nathan
Texas Tech University

Citations of this work

Defending the Hypothetical Author.Szu-Yen Lin - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (4):579-599.

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