DeRose on the conditionals of deliberation

Abstract

I take issue with two claims of DeRose: Conditionals of deliberation must not depend on backtracking grounds. ‘Were’ed-up conditionals coincide with future-directed indicative conditionals; the only difference in their meaning is that they must not depend on backtracking grounds. I use Egan’s counterexamples to causal decision theory to contest the first and an example of backtracking reasoning by David Lewis to contest the second claim. I tentatively outline a rivaling account of ‘were’ed-up conditionals which combines features of the standard analysis of counterfactuals with the contextual relevance of the corresponding indicative conditionals.

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2011-04-23

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Daniel Dohrn
Università degli Studi di Milano

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