Abstract

On the standard interpretation, Aristotle's conception of "nous" is geared against skeptical worries about the possibility of scientific knowledge and ultimately of the knowledge of first principles. On this view, Aristotle introduces "nous" as an intuitive faculty that grasps the first principles once and for all as true in such a way that it does not leave any room for the skeptic to press his skeptical point any further. This position views Aristotelian "nous" as having an internalist justificatory role in Aristotelian epistemology. In contrast, a minority (empiricist) position holds the same internalist justificatory view of "nous" but rejects its internally certifiable infallibility by stressing the connection between "nous" and Aristotelian induction. I argue that both approaches are flawed in that Aristotle's project in the "Posterior Analytics" is not to answer the skeptic on internalist justificatory grounds, but rather lay out a largely externalist "explication" of scientific knowledge