Trolleys and Double Effect in Experimental Ethics

In Christoph Luetge, Hannes Rusch & Matthias Uhl (eds.), Experimental Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


I analyse the relationship between the Doctrine of Double Effect and the Trolley Problem: the former offers a solution for the latter only on the premise that killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is permissible. Here I offer both empirical and theoretical arguments against the permissibility of killing the one: firstly, I present data from my own empirical studies according to which the intuition that killing the one is permissible is neither widespread nor stable; secondly, I defend a normative principle according to which killing the one in Bystander at the Switch is not permissible. In conclusion, there just is no trolley problem.



External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Self-Sacrifice and the Trolley Problem.Ezio Di Nucci - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):662-672.
Killing Innocents and the Doctrine of Double Effect.John Zeis - 2004 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:133-144.
The Danger of Double Effect.P. A. Reed - 2012 - Christian Bioethics 18 (3):287-300.
Killing, letting die, and the morality of abortion.Anton Tupa - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):1-26.
Some Light on Double Effect.James G. Hanink - 1975 - Analysis 35 (5):147 - 151.
Who is entitled to double effect?Joseph Boyle - 1991 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (5):475-494.


Added to PP

2,784 (#1,626)

6 months
434 (#1,000)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ezio Di Nucci
University of Copenhagen

Citations of this work

Contraception and Double Effect.Ezio Di Nucci - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics 14 (7):42-43.

Add more citations