Knowledge and availability

Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):554-573 (2018)
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Abstract

The mentioning of error-possibilities makes us less likely to ascribe knowledge. This paper offers a novel psychological account of this data. The account appeals to “subadditivity,” a well-known psychological tendency to judge possibilities as more likely when they are disjunctively described.

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10.1080/09515089.2018.1438594

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Author's Profile

Alexander Dinges
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

Citations of this work

On Deniability.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):372-401.
Much at stake in knowledge.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (5):729-749.
Salient Alternatives in Perspective.Mikkel Gerken, Chad Gonnerman, Joshua Alexander & John P. Waterman - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):792-810.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.

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