Eight Arguments against Double Effect

In Proceedings of the XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie (forthcoming)
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Abstract

I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.

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Ezio Di Nucci
University of Copenhagen

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