AbstractI offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.
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Retracted article: Strategic bombing, causal beliefs, and double effect.Ezio Di Nucci - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2):385-394.
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