Husserl and the normativity of logic

Southern Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In this article, I analyze the evolution of Husserl's view on the normativity of logic and the corresponding changes in his phenomenological analysis of judgment. Initially, in the Prolegomena, Husserl claimed that the laws of pure logic are ideal and acquire normative status only as a result of application. Later, however, he revised this position and claimed that the same laws are at once ideal and normative. Sections 1 and 2 present textual evidence for attributing such a change of position to Husserl, which is not generally acknowledged in the literature. Section 3 critically examines Husserl's early position, with specific attention to the model of instantiation. Sections 4–6 identify three key stages in the development of Husserl's theory of judgment that lead to the normative conception of pure logic: (1) the critique of the dissociation of ideal content and assertive force; (2) the rejection of the instantiation model of proposition and the development of a new account in terms of identification; (3) the genetic‐phenomenological interpretation of proposition and the elaboration of the three‐layer structure of pure logic.

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References found in this work

Frege, Kant, and the logic in logicism.John MacFarlane - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):25-65.
Logic in the twenties: The nature of the quantifier.Warren D. Goldfarb - 1979 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (3):351-368.
Introduction to Phenomenology.Robert Sokolowski - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (3):600-601.
Logic and reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1984 - Synthese 60 (1):107-127.

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