What We Together Ought to Do

Ethics 126 (4):955-982 (2016)
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I argue that we have not only individual reasons for action but also collective reasons for action: reasons which apply to us as a group. I next argue that if we together have a reason to act, then I may have a reason to do my part, but only when others will do theirs. Finally, I argue that collective reasons to do good can never make a difference to what individuals ought to do, but that other kinds of collective reasons can.



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Alexander Dietz
University of Southern California (PhD)

Citations of this work

Collective harm and the inefficacy problem.Julia Nefsky - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (4):e12587.
Pattern-Based Reasons and Disaster.Alexander Dietz - 2023 - Utilitas 35 (2):131–147.
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