Opinion pooling under informational asymmetries

Abstract

If a group as a whole is modelled as a single Bayesian agent, what should its beliefs be? I propose an axiomatic model that connects group beliefs to beliefs of group members, who are themselves modelled as Bayesian agents, possibly with di¤erent priors and di¤erent information. Group beliefs are shown to take a simple multiplicative form if people’s information is independent, and a more complex form if information can overlap arbitrarily. This shows that group beliefs can incorporate all information spread over the individuals without the individuals having to communicate their (possibly complex and hard-to-describe) private information; communicating prior and posterior beliefs su¢ ces.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Group beliefs.Raimo Tuomela - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):285-318.
Jeffrey conditioning and external Bayesianity.Carl Wagner - 2010 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 18 (2):336-345.
Group testimony.Deborah Tollefsen - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
Modelling collective belief.Margaret Gilbert - 1987 - Synthese 73 (1):185-204.
Bayesian group belief.Franz Dietrich - 2010 - Social Choice and Welfare 35 (4):595-626.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
17 (#819,600)

6 months
1 (#1,459,555)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references