Economics and Philosophy (forthcoming)

Authors
Franz Dietrich
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Brian Jabarian
University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Abstract
While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the 'original position', where one's future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty -- normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle -- maximising expected value (`Expectationalism') -- has different formulations, namely Ex-Ante Expectationalism, Ex-Post Expectationalism, and hybrid theories. These alternative theories recommend different decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition.
Keywords normative uncertainty  normative versus empirical uncertainty  expected value  Harsanyi  Rawls  original position  ex ante versus ex post criteria
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References found in this work BETA

What to Do When You Don’T Know What to Do.Andrew Sepielli - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:5-28.
Normative Uncertainty.William MacAskill - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Oxford

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Citations of this work BETA

Uncertain Preferences in Rational Decision.Moritz Schulz - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (6):605-627.

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