Synthese 197 (1):337-354 (2020)
AbstractWhen the results of an experiment appears to disconfirm a hypothesis, how does one know whether it’s the hypothesis, or rather some auxiliary hypothesis or assumption, that is at fault? Philosophers’ answers to this question, now known as “Duhem’s problem,” have differed widely. Despite these differences, we affirm Duhem’s original position that the logical structure of this problem alone does not allow a solution. A survey of philosophical approaches to Duhem’s problem indicates that what allows any philosopher, or scientists for that matter, to solve this problem is the addition of epistemic information that guides their assignment of praise and blame after a negative test. We therefore advocate a distinction between the logical and epistemic formulations of Duhem’s problem, the latter relying upon additional relevant information about the system being tested. Recognition of the role of this additional information suggests that some proposed solutions to the epistemic form of Duhem’s problem are preferable over others.
Similar books and articles
Epistemic Decision and the Duhem Problem.Po Keung Ip - 1983 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
Error statistics and Duhem's problem.Gregory R. Wheeler - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):410-420.
Exploration into Duhem 'Problem with Bayesian Approach'.Jian-Feng Zhang - 2007 - Modern Philosophy 5:131-136.
A Solution of Duhem's Problem on the Basis of the Logic of a Crucial Experiment.Young-eui Rhee - 2001 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton
Falsifiability and the Duhem Problem.Danny Frederick - 2020 - In Against the Philosophical Tide. Yeovil: Critias Publishing. pp. 15-19.
Experimental psychology and Duhem's problem.Sam S. Rakover - 2003 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 33 (1):45–66.
A Bayesian Treatment of Duhem's Thesis: The Case of the ‘Farm Problem’ in Agricultural Economics.David Dearmont - 1997 - Economics and Philosophy 13 (2):149-158.
Bayesian confirmation and auxiliary hypotheses revisited: A reply to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302.
Conventionalism about what? Where Duhem and Poincaré part ways.Milena Ivanova - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 54:80-89.
Duhem's problem, the bayesian way, and error statistics, or "what's belief got to do with it?".Deborah G. Mayo - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (2):222-244.
Motivational realism: The natural classification for Pierre Duhem.Karen Merikangas Darling - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1125-1136.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Theory Change in Science: Strategies From Mendelian Genetics.Lindley Darden - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
Error and the growth of experimental knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):455-459.